Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions /
We analyze the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions, such as contract enforcement, rule of law, and property rights. In our model, firms differ in their preferences for institutional quality, which is determined endogenously in a political economy framewo...
| Հիմնական հեղինակ: | |
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| Այլ հեղինակներ: | |
| Ձևաչափ: | Ամսագիր |
| Լեզու: | English |
| Հրապարակվել է: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
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| Շարք: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/056 |
| Առցանց հասանելիություն: | Full text available on IMF |
| Ամփոփում: | We analyze the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions, such as contract enforcement, rule of law, and property rights. In our model, firms differ in their preferences for institutional quality, which is determined endogenously in a political economy framework. We show that trade opening can worsen institutions when it increases the political power of a small elite of large exporters who prefer to maintain bad institutions. The detrimental effect of trade on institutions is most likely to occur when a small country captures a sufficiently large share of world exports in sectors characterized by economic profits. |
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| Նյութի նկարագրություն: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Ֆիզիկական նկարագրություն: | 1 online resource (54 pages) |
| Ձևաչափ: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Հասանելի: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |