Who Controls the Budget : The Legislature or the Executive? /

Country-specific factors prevent a strong linear relationship between the legislature's budgetary powers and the extent of its separation from the executive. Electoral and voting systems, bicameralism, constitutional and legal constraints, voluntary contracts of political parties, and long-stan...

Full beskrivning

Bibliografiska uppgifter
Huvudupphovsman: Lienert, Ian
Materialtyp: Tidskrift
Språk:English
Publicerad: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005.
Serie:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/115
Länkar:Full text available on IMF
LEADER 01706cas a2200241 a 4500
001 AALejournalIMF008829
008 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d
020 |c 5.00 USD 
020 |z 9781451861341 
022 |a 1018-5941 
040 |a BD-DhAAL  |c BD-DhAAL 
100 1 |a Lienert, Ian. 
245 1 0 |a Who Controls the Budget :   |b The Legislature or the Executive? /  |c Ian Lienert. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2005. 
300 |a 1 online resource (26 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Country-specific factors prevent a strong linear relationship between the legislature's budgetary powers and the extent of its separation from the executive. Electoral and voting systems, bicameralism, constitutional and legal constraints, voluntary contracts of political parties, and long-standing traditions all influence the relative budgetary powers of executives and legislatures. Differences in the legislature's budgetary authority in twenty-eight countries with five different forms of government are examined. It is concluded that differences in budgetary powers within a particular form of government are as great as those between different forms of government. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2005/115 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/115/001.2005.issue-115-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library