Sovereign Bond Restructuring : Collective Action Clauses and official Crisis Intervention /
This paper compares the restructuring of sovereign bonds with and without collective action clauses. One conclusion is that collective action clauses can allow efficient debt renegotiation in a formal model of sovereign debt renegotiation while unanimity rules offer incentives for opportunistic beha...
| Hoofdauteur: | Kletzer, Kenneth |
|---|---|
| Formaat: | Tijdschrift |
| Taal: | English |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2003.
|
| Reeks: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2003/134 |
| Online toegang: | Full text available on IMF |
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