Why Do Many Disinflations Fail? : The Importance of Luck, Timing, and Political Institutions /

Many inflation stabilizations succeed only temporarily. Using a sample of 51 episodes of stabilization from inflation levels above 40 percent, we show that most of the failures are explained by bad luck, unfavorable initial conditions, and inadequate political institutions. The evolution of trading...

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מידע ביבליוגרפי
מחבר ראשי: Hamann, A.
מחברים אחרים: Prati, Alessandro
פורמט: כתב-עת
שפה:English
יצא לאור: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
סדרה:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/228
גישה מקוונת:Full text available on IMF
תיאור
סיכום:Many inflation stabilizations succeed only temporarily. Using a sample of 51 episodes of stabilization from inflation levels above 40 percent, we show that most of the failures are explained by bad luck, unfavorable initial conditions, and inadequate political institutions. The evolution of trading partners' demand and U.S. interest rates captures the effect of bad luck. Past inflation affects the outcome in two different ways: a long history of high inflation makes failure more likely, while a high level of inflation prior to stabilization increases the chances of success. Countries with short-lived political institutions, a weak executive authority, and proportional electoral rules also tend to fail. After controlling for all these factors, we find that exchange-rate-based stabilizations are more likely to succeed. These findings are robust across measures of failure (two dichotomous and one continuous), sample selection criteria, and estimation techniques, including Heckman's correction for the endogeneity of the anchor.
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תיאור פיזי:1 online resource (64 pages)
פורמט:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
גישה:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students