Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game /

This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played betwee...

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Bibliografiske detaljer
Hovedforfatter: Ley, Eduardo
Format: Tidsskrift
Sprog:English
Udgivet: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Serier:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/081
Fag:
Online adgang:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game /  |c Eduardo Ley. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2002. 
300 |a 1 online resource (13 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood). 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Bayesian Analysis  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Contract Curve  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue  |2 imf 
650 7 |a WP  |2 imf 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2002/081 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/081/001.2002.issue-081-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library