Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game /
This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played betwee...
| मुख्य लेखक: | |
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| स्वरूप: | पत्रिका |
| भाषा: | English |
| प्रकाशित: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| श्रृंखला: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/081 |
| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Full text available on IMF |
| सारांश: | This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood). |
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| वस्तु वर्णन: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| भौतिक वर्णन: | 1 online resource (13 pages) |
| स्वरूप: | Mode of access: Internet |
| आईएसएसएन: | 1018-5941 |
| अभिगमन: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |