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|z 9781451854916
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Gershenson, Dmitry.
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|a Seductions of an Underdevelopment Trap :
|b Systemic Impediments to Agricultural Reform in Russia /
|c Dmitry Gershenson, Maria Amelina.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2002.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (35 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Despite ambitious agricultural reforms initiated by the federal government, inefficient and unprofitable producers predominate in post-Soviet Russia. However, in some regions a more robust restructuring has taken place. Observing two Russian regions-one with substantially restructured agricultural production, and one in which Soviet-style coordination predominates-we develop a model of the interactions between political and economic incentives that lead to these divergent outcomes. The model identifies region- and sector-specific characteristics that encourage some regional governments to maintain Soviet-style redistribution structures and make producers forsake more efficient outcomes as more costly, while encouraging other regions to pursue reform.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Amelina, Maria.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2002/126
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/126/001.2002.issue-126-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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