Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality /
Understanding of the domestic political environment is key to building broad country ownership and the successful implementation of reform programs supported by international financial institutions (IFIs). But recipient countries are not unitary actors: policymakers are influenced by special interes...
| Autor principal: | Mourmouras, Alex |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | Mayer, Wolfgang |
| Formato: | Revista |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
|
| Colección: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/073 |
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Full text available on IMF |
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