Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality /

Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality /

Understanding of the domestic political environment is key to building broad country ownership and the successful implementation of reform programs supported by international financial institutions (IFIs). But recipient countries are not unitary actors: policymakers are influenced by special interes...

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Detaylı Bibliyografya
Yazar: Mourmouras, Alex
Diğer Yazarlar: Mayer, Wolfgang
Materyal Türü: Dergi
Dil:English
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Seri Bilgileri:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/073
Konular:
Economic Policy
Objective Function
Welfare Contour
WP
Online Erişim:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Mourmouras, Alex. 
245 1 0 |a Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality /  |c Alex Mourmouras, Wolfgang Mayer. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2002. 
300 |a 1 online resource (28 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Understanding of the domestic political environment is key to building broad country ownership and the successful implementation of reform programs supported by international financial institutions (IFIs). But recipient countries are not unitary actors: policymakers are influenced by special interest groups (SIGs) opposing reforms, leading to distorted policies. Using a new model of the financial relations between a benevolent IFI and a sovereign borrower subject to influence by SIGs, we analyze the determinants and welfare impacts of conditional and unconditional assistance. While conditionality may raise IFI welfare, economize on the amount of assistance, and lower domestic distortions, it may not always raise recipient country welfare. Recipient governments are always better off if assistance is provided unconditionally. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Economic Policy  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Objective Function  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Welfare Contour  |2 imf 
650 7 |a WP  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Mayer, Wolfgang. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2002/073 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/073/001.2002.issue-073-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library 

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