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|z 9781451973594
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|a 1934-7456
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Sdralevich, Carlo.
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|a The New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring :
|b Setting the Incentives Right /
|c Carlo Sdralevich, Biaggio Bossone.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2002.
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|a 1 online resource (27 pages)
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|a IMF Policy Discussion Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The paper discusses key incentive-related issues of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism recently outlined by the IMF First Deputy Managing Director. The structure of incentives in the mechanism should be consistent with the principle of favoring market-oriented, voluntary solutions to financial crises. The paper frames the mechanism in the context of involving the private sector in financial crisis resolution (PSI), and identifies the conditions for setting up an appropriate incentive structure. The paper explores issues relating to the functioning of the mechanism, including access policy on IMF resources; the power to activate the mechanism; its relation with intermediate PSI instruments; and its impact on investment in emerging markets.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Bossone, Biaggio.
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|a IMF Policy Discussion Papers; Policy Discussion Paper ;
|v No. 2002/004
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/003/2002/004/003.2002.issue-004-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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