Tariffs, Optimal Taxes, and Collection Costs /

This paper studies an optimal tax problem for a small open economy where collecting taxes is costly. It is shown that, in the presence of collection costs modeled as an increasing function of the tax rate: (a) the standard rules of optimal commodity taxation (the Ramsey, the inverse elasticity, the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Mihaljek, Dubravko
Formato: Revista
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1992.
Colección:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1992/028
Acceso en línea:Full text available on IMF
Descripción
Sumario:This paper studies an optimal tax problem for a small open economy where collecting taxes is costly. It is shown that, in the presence of collection costs modeled as an increasing function of the tax rate: (a) the standard rules of optimal commodity taxation (the Ramsey, the inverse elasticity, the Corlett-Hague rules) may no longer be valid; (b) tariffs may replace domestic taxes as a second-best revenue-raising device; and (c) the optimal tariff/tax structure may be uniform rather than differentiated.
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Descripción Física:1 online resource (34 pages)
Formato:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
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