The Behavior of Real Interest Rates in Exchange-Rate Based Stabilization Programs /

This paper examines the behavior of real interest rates in exchange-rate based stabilization programs. The analysis is based on a model with imperfect capital mobility and optimizing agents. A permanent reduction in the devaluation rate is first shown to have an ambiguous effect on real interest rat...

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Bibliografski detalji
Glavni autor: Agenor, Pierre-Richard
Format: Žurnal
Jezik:English
Izdano: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1994.
Serija:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1994/075
Online pristup:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Agenor, Pierre-Richard. 
245 1 4 |a The Behavior of Real Interest Rates in Exchange-Rate Based Stabilization Programs /  |c Pierre-Richard Agenor. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 1994. 
300 |a 1 online resource (46 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper examines the behavior of real interest rates in exchange-rate based stabilization programs. The analysis is based on a model with imperfect capital mobility and optimizing agents. A permanent reduction in the devaluation rate is first shown to have an ambiguous effect on real interest rates on impact. The analysis is then extended to consider a stabilization program characterized by an initial reduction in the rate of devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, and the announcement of a future increase in income taxes. The impact effect on real interest rates is shown to depend upon the degree of credibility of the announcement. Real interest rates may fall if agents do not believe that taxes will be raised, and rise if the future tax reform is sufficiently credible. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 1994/075 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1994/075/001.1994.issue-075-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library