To "B" or Not to "B" : A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model /
This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R and D sector. On the other hand, the e...
| 1. autor: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Czasopismo |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Seria: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/189 |
| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | Full text available on IMF |
| Streszczenie: | This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R and D sector. On the other hand, the enhanced competition for the equipment improves efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Should monopolies protected by intellectual property rights be broken up? The answer is 'no' in a Romer-type growth model, but there is sufficient reason to believe that the answer could be 'yes' in a model advocated by Jones (1995). |
|---|---|
| Deskrypcja: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Opis fizyczny: | 1 online resource (18 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Ograniczenie dostępu: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |