The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession /

The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession /

In this paper we consider a model of the country with heterogeneous population and examine compensation schemes that may prevent a threat of secession by dissatisfied regions. We show that horizontal imbalances are combatable with secession-proof compensation schemes that entail a degree of partial...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Le Breton, Michel
Other Authors: Weber, Shlomo
Format: Journal
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/176
Subjects:
Cost Allocation
Partial Equalization
Threat Of Secession
Transfer Schemes
WP
Russian Federation
Online Access:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Le Breton, Michel. 
245 1 4 |a The Art of Making Everybody Happy :   |b How to Prevent a Secession /  |c Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2001. 
300 |a 1 online resource (36 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a In this paper we consider a model of the country with heterogeneous population and examine compensation schemes that may prevent a threat of secession by dissatisfied regions. We show that horizontal imbalances are combatable with secession-proof compensation schemes that entail a degree of partial equalization: the disadvantageous regions should be subsidized but the burden on advantageous regions should not be too excessive. In the case of uniform distribution, we establish the 50-percent compensation rule for disadvantageous regions. Thus, we argue for a limited gap reduction between advantageous and disadvantageous regions and show that neither laissez faire nor Rawlsian allocation is secession-proof. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Cost Allocation  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Partial Equalization  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Threat Of Secession  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Transfer Schemes  |2 imf 
650 7 |a WP  |2 imf 
651 7 |a Russian Federation  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Weber, Shlomo. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2001/176 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/176/001.2001.issue-176-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library 

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