The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession /

In this paper we consider a model of the country with heterogeneous population and examine compensation schemes that may prevent a threat of secession by dissatisfied regions. We show that horizontal imbalances are combatable with secession-proof compensation schemes that entail a degree of partial...

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Bibliografiske detaljer
Hovedforfatter: Le Breton, Michel
Andre forfattere: Weber, Shlomo
Format: Tidsskrift
Sprog:English
Udgivet: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Serier:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/176
Fag:
Online adgang:Full text available on IMF
Beskrivelse
Summary:In this paper we consider a model of the country with heterogeneous population and examine compensation schemes that may prevent a threat of secession by dissatisfied regions. We show that horizontal imbalances are combatable with secession-proof compensation schemes that entail a degree of partial equalization: the disadvantageous regions should be subsidized but the burden on advantageous regions should not be too excessive. In the case of uniform distribution, we establish the 50-percent compensation rule for disadvantageous regions. Thus, we argue for a limited gap reduction between advantageous and disadvantageous regions and show that neither laissez faire nor Rawlsian allocation is secession-proof.
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Fysisk beskrivelse:1 online resource (36 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Adgang:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students