Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government /
Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the 'economic model of politics' proposes a public choice approach, which does not rely on social welfare functions. With it, a country's overall budget can be derive...
| Autore principale: | Olters, Jan-Peter |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Periodico |
| Lingua: | English |
| Pubblicazione: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Serie: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/174 |
| Accesso online: | Full text available on IMF |
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