The Complier Pays Principle : The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management /
This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches. Far from encouraging more sustainable forest management, fiscal instruments such as an inappropriate tax p...
| Glavni avtor: | Leruth, Luc |
|---|---|
| Drugi avtorji: | Paris, R., Ruzicka, I. |
| Format: | Revija |
| Jezik: | English |
| Izdano: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Serija: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/051 |
| Online dostop: | Full text available on IMF |
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