|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
01786cas a2200265 a 4500 |
| 001 |
AALejournalIMF007695 |
| 008 |
230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d |
| 020 |
|
|
|c 5.00 USD
|
| 020 |
|
|
|z 9781451847109
|
| 022 |
|
|
|a 1018-5941
|
| 040 |
|
|
|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Leruth, Luc.
|
| 245 |
1 |
4 |
|a The Complier Pays Principle :
|b The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management /
|c Luc Leruth, R. Paris, I. Ruzicka.
|
| 264 |
|
1 |
|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2000.
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (28 pages)
|
| 490 |
1 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
| 500 |
|
|
|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
|
| 500 |
|
|
|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
|
| 506 |
|
|
|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
|
| 520 |
3 |
|
|a This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches. Far from encouraging more sustainable forest management, fiscal instruments such as an inappropriate tax policy can actually undermine it. The paper uses the arguments at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. The paper also proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs.
|
| 538 |
|
|
|a Mode of access: Internet
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Paris, R.
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Ruzicka, I.
|
| 830 |
|
0 |
|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2000/051
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/051/001.2000.issue-051-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
|