Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability /
This paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization. In our model, dependable-but not fully credible-governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratin...
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| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/086 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |