Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism /
Vertical tax externalities between levels of government can occur in federal structures, with responses to the tax policies of one level of government affecting the tax base of the other. Such effects mostly arise when federal and state governments co-occupy the same tax base. This paper examines th...
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| Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1997.
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| Seri Bilgileri: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1997/173 |
| Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |
| Özet: | Vertical tax externalities between levels of government can occur in federal structures, with responses to the tax policies of one level of government affecting the tax base of the other. Such effects mostly arise when federal and state governments co-occupy the same tax base. This paper examines these externalities by considering their implications for a range of issues in fiscal federalism: the relationship between state and federal tax rates, the equilibrium levels of these taxes, the relevance of experience in federal countries for policy design in international settings, intergovernmental grants, and the assignment of tax powers among levels of government. |
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| Diğer Bilgileri: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Fiziksel Özellikler: | 1 online resource (35 pages) |
| Materyal Türü: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Erişim: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |