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|z 9781451845921
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
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|a Sala-i-Martin, Xavier.
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|a Transfers, Social Safety Nets, and Economic Growth /
|c Xavier Sala-i-Martin.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1996.
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|a 1 online resource (31 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper analyses the role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfers and wage subsidies. It is argued that public welfare programs can be viewed as a crime-preventing or disruption-preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunity cost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in the presence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, the optimal size of the public welfare program is found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income (not lump-sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary. The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee on congested public goods and transfers can be thought of as productive public goods subject to congestion. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation between transfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1996/040
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1996/040/001.1996.issue-040-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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