Leadership Contestability, Monopolistic Rents and Growth /
I construct an endogenous growth model where R and D is carried out at the industry level in a game of innovation between leaders and followers. Innovation costs for followers are assumed to increase with the technological lag from leaders. We obtain three results that contrast with standard Schumpe...
| मुख्य लेखक: | Piazza, Roberto |
|---|---|
| स्वरूप: | पत्रिका |
| भाषा: | English |
| प्रकाशित: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2011.
|
| श्रृंखला: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2011/063 |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Full text available on IMF |
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