Overborrowing, Financial Crises and 'Macro-prudential' Policy /
This paper studies overborrowing, financial crises and macro-prudential policy in an equilibrium model of business cycles and asset prices with collateral constraints. Agents in a decentralized competitive equilibrium do not internalize the negative effects of asset fire-sales on the value of other...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | |
| التنسيق: | دورية |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2011.
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| سلاسل: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2011/024 |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Full text available on IMF |