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|z 9781455210756
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|a Ranciere, Romain.
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|a Inequality, Leverage and Crises /
|c Romain Ranciere, Michael Kumhof.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2010.
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|a 1 online resource (37 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution. Empirically, the periods 1920-1929 and 1983-2008 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich, a large increase in leverage for the remainder, and an eventual financial and real crisis. The paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes. A financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction. But restoration of the lower income group's bargaining power is more effective.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Kumhof, Michael.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2010/268
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/268/001.2010.issue-268-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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