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|z 9781455209477
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|a Makarova, Yuliya.
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|a Bankers Without Borders? :
|b Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks /
|c Yuliya Makarova, Anna Ilyina, Christian Schmieder, Eugenio Cerutti.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2010.
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|a 1 online resource (35 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper presents a stylized analysis of the effects of ring-fencing (i.e., different restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profits and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions) on cross-border banks. Using a sample of 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE), we analyze the impact of a CESE credit shock on the capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under different forms of ring-fencing. Our simulations show that under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Cerutti, Eugenio.
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|a Ilyina, Anna.
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|a Schmieder, Christian.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2010/247
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/247/001.2010.issue-247-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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