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|z 9781455209316
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Yafeh, Yishay.
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|a Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions /
|c Yishay Yafeh, Kenichi Ueda, Stijn Claessens.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2010.
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|a 1 online resource (45 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Financial frictions have been identified as key factors affecting economic fluctuations and growth. But, can institutional reforms reduce financial frictions? Based on a canonical investment model, we consider two potential channels: (i) financial transaction costs at the firm level; and (ii) required return at the country level. We empirically investigate the effects of institutions on these financial frictions using a panel of 75,000 firm-years across 48 countries for the period 1990 - 2007. We find that improved corporate governance (e.g., less informational problems) and enhanced contractual enforcement reduce financial frictions, while stronger creditor rights (e.g., lower collateral constraints) are less important.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Claessens, Stijn.
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|a Ueda, Kenichi.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2010/231
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/231/001.2010.issue-231-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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