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|z 9781455205424
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Mishra, Prachi.
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|a Protection for Free? :
|b The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff suspensions /
|c Prachi Mishra, Rodney D. Ludema, Anna Maria Mayda.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2010.
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|a 1 online resource (48 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on Congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about the value of protection, via costless messages (cheap-talk) and costly messages (lobbying). We estimate our model using firm-level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures from 1999-2006, and find that indeed verbal opposition by import-competing firms, with no lobbying, significantly reduces the probability of a suspension being granted. In addition, lobbying expenditures by proponent and opponent firms sway this probability in opposite directions.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Ludema, Rodney D.
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|a Mayda, Anna Maria.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2010/211
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/211/001.2010.issue-211-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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