Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge /
Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, there exists some consensus about the benefits of acting in this way. However, other studies warn that increasing the precision of public inf...
| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2010.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2010/091 |
| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |