Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge /
Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, there exists some consensus about the benefits of acting in this way. However, other studies warn that increasing the precision of public inf...
| Հիմնական հեղինակ: | |
|---|---|
| Ձևաչափ: | Ամսագիր |
| Լեզու: | English |
| Հրապարակվել է: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2010.
|
| Շարք: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2010/091 |
| Խորագրեր: | |
| Առցանց հասանելիություն: | Full text available on IMF |