Optimal Monetary Policy with Overlapping Generations of Policymakers /
In this paper I study the effect of imperfect central bank commitment on inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which the monetary authority is a committee that consists of members who serve overlapping, finite terms. Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members deci...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | Επιστημονικό περιοδικό |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2010.
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| Σειρά: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2010/032 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full text available on IMF |