Who Disciplines Bank Managers? /

We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeho...

詳細記述

書誌詳細
第一著者: Maechler, Andrea
その他の著者: Cihak, Martin, Schaeck, Klaus, Stolz, Stephanie Marie
フォーマット: 雑誌
言語:English
出版事項: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009.
シリーズ:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/272
オンライン・アクセス:Full text available on IMF