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|z 9781451873542
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Laeven, Luc.
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|a Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis /
|c Luc Laeven, Harry Huizinga.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2009.
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|a 1 online resource (41 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Huizinga, Harry.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2009/207
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2009/207/001.2009.issue-207-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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