Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships /

There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s)....

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: De Palma, Andre
Weitere Verfasser: Leruth, Luc, Prunier, Guillaume
Format: Zeitschrift
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009.
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/177
Schlagworte:
Online Zugang:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships /  |c Andre De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth. 
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520 3 |a There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered. 
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651 7 |a United States  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Leruth, Luc. 
700 1 |a Prunier, Guillaume. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2009/177 
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