Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System /
Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Lander, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Lander, benefiting from t...
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| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2009/124 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |