Simple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules /
This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclic...
| Egile nagusia: | Kumhof, Michael |
|---|---|
| Beste egile batzuk: | Laxton, Douglas |
| Formatua: | Aldizkaria |
| Hizkuntza: | English |
| Argitaratua: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
|
| Saila: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2009/076 |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | Full text available on IMF |
Antzeko izenburuak
-
Simple Monetary Rules Under Fiscal Dominance /
nork: Kumhof, Michael
Argitaratua: (2007) -
Jointly Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules under Borrowing Constraints /
nork: Kumhof, Michael
Argitaratua: (2009) -
Fiscal Policy Rules /
nork: Kopits, George
Argitaratua: (1998) -
International Policy Coordination and Simple Monetary Policy Rules /
nork: Berger, Wolfram
Argitaratua: (2006) -
Chile's Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule : A Model-Based Evaluation /
nork: Kumhof, Michael
Argitaratua: (2009)