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|z 9781451871029
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Mishra, Prachi.
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|a Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? /
|c Prachi Mishra, Giovanni Facchini, Anna Maria Mayda.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2008.
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|a 1 online resource (56 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Facchini, Giovanni.
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|a Mayda, Anna Maria.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2008/244
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/244/001.2008.issue-244-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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