A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /
We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the retu...
| Tác giả chính: | |
|---|---|
| Tác giả khác: | , |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008.
|
| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2008/236 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |