A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /
We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the retu...
| Main Author: | Zettelmeyer, Jeromin |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Jeanne, Olivier, Ostry, Jonathan |
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2008/236 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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