Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt /
We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while f...
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| 格式: | 雜誌 |
| 語言: | English |
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Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008.
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| 叢編: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2008/164 |
| 在線閱讀: | Full text available on IMF |