|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
01685cas a2200253 a 4500 |
| 001 |
AALejournalIMF004967 |
| 008 |
230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d |
| 020 |
|
|
|c 5.00 USD
|
| 020 |
|
|
|z 9781451869330
|
| 022 |
|
|
|a 1018-5941
|
| 040 |
|
|
|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Brosio, Giorgio.
|
| 245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries :
|b Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy /
|c Giorgio Brosio, Ehtisham Ahmad.
|
| 264 |
|
1 |
|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2008.
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (27 pages)
|
| 490 |
1 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
| 500 |
|
|
|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
|
| 500 |
|
|
|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
|
| 506 |
|
|
|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
|
| 520 |
3 |
|
|a A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.
|
| 538 |
|
|
|a Mode of access: Internet
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Ahmad, Ehtisham.
|
| 830 |
|
0 |
|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2008/071
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/071/001.2008.issue-071-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
|