Banks As Coordinators of Economic Growth /

This paper formally identifies an important role of banks: Banks competitively internalize production externalities and facilitate economic growth. I formulate a canonical growth model with externalities as a game among consumers, firms, and banks. Banks compete for deposits to seek monopoly profits...

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale: Ueda, Kenichi
Natura: Periodico
Lingua:English
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Serie:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/264
Accesso online:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Banks As Coordinators of Economic Growth /  |c Kenichi Ueda. 
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300 |a 1 online resource (75 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper formally identifies an important role of banks: Banks competitively internalize production externalities and facilitate economic growth. I formulate a canonical growth model with externalities as a game among consumers, firms, and banks. Banks compete for deposits to seek monopoly profits, including externalities. Using loan contracts that specify price and quantity, banks control firms' investments. Each bank forms a firm group endogenously and internalizes externalities directly within a firm group and indirectly across firm groups. This unique equilibrium requires a condition that separates competition for sources and uses of funds. I present a realistic institution that satisfies this condition. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2006/264 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/264/001.2006.issue-264-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library