Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate /
A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictio...
主要作者: | Crowe, Christopher |
---|---|
格式: | 杂志 |
语言: | English |
出版: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
丛编: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/256 |
主题: | |
在线阅读: | Full text available on IMF |
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