Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers /

Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers /

Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker, and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect th...

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Dades bibliogràfiques
Autor principal: Masson, Paul
Altres autors: Drazen, Allan
Format: Revista
Idioma:English
Publicat: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1994.
Col·lecció:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1994/049
Matèries:
Anti-Inflationary Policies Increase
Government Debt Accumulation
Objective Function
Policy Credibility
WP
Germany
Accés en línia:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Masson, Paul. 
245 1 0 |a Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers /  |c Paul Masson, Allan Drazen. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 1994. 
300 |a 1 online resource (28 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker, and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on data for the interest rate differential between France and Germany and find support for our hypothesis. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Anti-Inflationary Policies Increase  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Government Debt Accumulation  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Objective Function  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Policy Credibility  |2 imf 
650 7 |a WP  |2 imf 
651 7 |a Germany  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Drazen, Allan. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 1994/049 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1994/049/001.1994.issue-049-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library 

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