Lending Resumption After Default : Lessons from Capital Markets During the 19th Century /

This paper mines the experience of capital markets during the 19th century to propose an alternative way of interpreting international default episodes. The standard view is that defaulting on sovereign debt entails exclusion from capital markets. Yet we have observed multiple instances of sovereign...

Disgrifiad llawn

Manylion Llyfryddiaeth
Prif Awdur: Sole, Juan
Fformat: Cylchgrawn
Iaith:English
Cyhoeddwyd: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Cyfres:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/176
Mynediad Ar-lein:Full text available on IMF
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020 |c 5.00 USD 
020 |z 9781451864366 
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100 1 |a Sole, Juan. 
245 1 0 |a Lending Resumption After Default :   |b Lessons from Capital Markets During the 19th Century /  |c Juan Sole. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2006. 
300 |a 1 online resource (28 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper mines the experience of capital markets during the 19th century to propose an alternative way of interpreting international default episodes. The standard view is that defaulting on sovereign debt entails exclusion from capital markets. Yet we have observed multiple instances of sovereign debt default in which the reaction of lenders was not the one predicted by the punishment story: in some cases, lending ceased for long periods, but in others it was not interrupted. This paper claims that the reaction of lenders after default stems from the additional knowledge about the borrower that lenders acquire during these episodes. The lending relationship is modeled in a costly state-verification environment in which governments have private information about their investment projects (good or bad). It is shown that, in the event of default, it is worthwhile for lenders to find out more about the type of project, and then interrupt lending only if the project is believed to be a bad one. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2006/176 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/176/001.2006.issue-176-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library