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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451864380
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Wei, Shang-Jin.
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|a A Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows /
|c Shang-Jin Wei, Jiandong Ju.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2006.
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|a 1 online resource (39 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a International capital flows from rich to poor countries can be regarded as either too low (the Lucas paradox in a one-sector model) or too high (when compared with the logic of factor price equalization in a two-sector model). To resolve the paradoxes, we introduce a non-neoclassical model which features financial contracts and firm heterogeneity. In our model, free patterns of gross capital flow emerge as a function of the quality of the financial system and the level of protection for property rights(i.e., the risk of expropriation. A poor country with an inefficient financial system but a low expropriation risk may simultaneously experience an outflow of financial capital but an inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), resulting in a small net flow.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Ju, Jiandong.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2006/178
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/178/001.2006.issue-178-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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