Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff /

An implication of the "globalization hazard" hypothesis is that sudden stops could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard by creating international moral h...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Mendoza, Enrique
Autres auteurs: Durdu, Ceyhun Bora
Format: Revue
Langue:English
Publié: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Collection:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/073
Accès en ligne:Full text available on IMF