On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting /

This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future proba...

وصف كامل

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Bolt, Wilko
مؤلفون آخرون: Tieman, Alexander
التنسيق: دورية
اللغة:English
منشور في: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
سلاسل:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/302
الموضوعات:
WP
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:Full text available on IMF

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