On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting /
This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future proba...
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| Diğer Yazarlar: | |
| Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
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| Seri Bilgileri: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/302 |
| Konular: | |
| Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |