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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451865622
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Bolt, Wilko.
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|a On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting /
|c Wilko Bolt, Alexander Tieman.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2006.
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|a 1 online resource (16 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a WP
|2 imf
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|a Tieman, Alexander.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2006/302
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/302/001.2006.issue-302-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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