On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting /

This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future proba...

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Autor principal: Bolt, Wilko
Altres autors: Tieman, Alexander
Format: Revista
Idioma:English
Publicat: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Col·lecció:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/302
Matèries:
WP
Accés en línia:Full text available on IMF
Descripció
Sumari:This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature.
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Descripció física:1 online resource (16 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Accés:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students