Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : A Model of Vote Buying /
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We f...
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| Tác giả khác: | |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/011 |
| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |